Did strategic patience achieve Egypt’s regional goals?

Cairo – The so-called strategic patience occupied part of the political and media debate in Egypt during the past two days, following the increase in positive messages coming from Ankara after Doha to Cairo to confirm that caution, carefulness and patience achieved good goals. For more than seven years, the incitement against the Egyptian regime has not stopped. Lots of dirty ways to break his bones, and in the end, relations with Qatar and Turkey tend to improve.

Cairo achieved a moral victory over Turkey, and it seemed that the strategic patience, which was widely used by some politicians in the world, starting with the former US President Barack Obama and even the leader of the Lebanese Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, may turn into an independent theory in political literature when the clouds over the state increase and rise The tools of its strength gradually and the surrounding conditions appear fluid and full of challenges.

Many observers did not imagine that Egypt would jump on a large package of regional and international crises as well as internal since the fall of the Brotherhood regime on July 3, 2013 without losses or material concessions, as it faced many problems armed with patience that seemed to be “helplessness” or from the painkillers. It reduces the level of pain and does not address it until a breeze of appeasement begins with Doha and Ankara, two of the capitals most hostile to Cairo.

I was brought together by a great Egyptian official about two years ago, and a discussion took place between us about what is happening in Libya and other regional issues related to national security, and his answers to my questions were mostly short, but I remember an important sentence that he said, “Be patient, and you will see the size of the changes in the regional map.” At the time, this phrase had no strong meaning.

Strategic patience achieved its goal in Libya without Egypt being forced to intervene militarily, which was not far away, since President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi identified the Sirte-Al-Jufra red line last June, no effective breakthrough occurred in it, and the features of fixing the ceasefire began to expand, then the political settlement took its way. A new government and presidential council were formed, and Cairo strengthened its openness to all Libyan forces and adjusted their positions to enable them to open up to all powers in the east, west and south.

Egypt was able to establish its vision in the eastern Mediterranean gas, strengthened its relations with both Greece and Cyprus and demarcated its maritime borders with them, inaugurated the Gas Forum and turned it into a regional organization based in Cairo and made it open to the forces committed to the rules of international law, referring to the continued exclusion of Turkey that is looking for a formula to join To him through Egypt after it was proven that there are enormous wealth at the bottom of the Mediterranean.

Three main files

The theory of strategic patience can also be applied to three important files, whether progressing or being delayed, but in the end, major transformations occurred that were not expected at the beginning and helped in their outcome to learn more of the benefits of patience with crises and managing them wisely.

The first: Egypt’s success in diversifying arms sources, possessing great capabilities, and concluding deals with countries in the East and West, and creating a delicate balance in this equation. This file was wisely managed and many changes were taken advantage of in the international arena that allowed for flexibility in this issue, unlike in past years it was just Leaning in it to one side means losing the other side.

The second: Transforming the Brotherhood file from a local issue to placing it among the priorities of some major countries. Western countries have discovered the extent of the danger involved in this organization and its intertwining with extremist and terrorist forces across borders, which is what Cairo called for and was not paid attention to and was dealt with as Egyptian propaganda. Aimed at “political opposition”, not to mention the varied employment of this paper by major and small powers.

The third is related to Sudan, as Egypt’s relations with him reached a bad point at the end of the era of former President Omar al-Bashir until the factors of the revolution in the country were tested and got rid of him and his regime, and a military and political class appeared in Khartoum that did not object to cooperation and coordination with Cairo, and relations began to reach the level of She did not inform him before about harmony, preserving common interests, and adopting identical perceptions on vital issues.

The details of the developments in the previous files are sufficient to confirm that there is a distant vision that ruled dealing with it, but it did not reach broad groups of citizens in Egypt, perhaps the secret nature of the tasks that crossed it or the lack of delivery of correct information to the public opinion, and perhaps the predominance of the anti-Cairo speech.

The Egyptian administration began to gain more confidence in the mechanisms of its dealings with the issues of Turkey, Qatar, the Brotherhood, the Eastern Mediterranean, Libya and Sudan, in addition to not ruling out its ability to preserve the basic principles in the Palestinian issue, which faced a growing challenge after signing a number of peace agreements between Israel and Arab countries.

The Egyptian perspective on managing the case seemed to be on the verge of collapsing, but the positive step that Cairo had made in cooperation with Amman was about to reset the Palestinian rudder and restore it to its previous path based on the two-state solution. .
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